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NOTES
Duty and Disaster: Holding Local Governments Liable for
Permitting Uses in High-Hazard Areas
In the early morning hours of September 16, 1999, Hurricane
Floyd came ashore at Wilmington, North Carolina. By the time the
skies cleared, the storm had left twenty inches of rain in much of the
eastern part of the state' and had caused what Governor James Hunt
called "'a disaster like we've never had before in North Carolina.' "2
Flooding caused fifty-one deaths,3 stranded more than one thousand
people, 4 and closed parts of three hundred roads, including all major
roads accessing a six-county region.5 State officials estimated that
Hurricane Floyd caused $5.3 billion in damage in North Carolina.6
North Carolina's experience with Hurricane Floyd vividly
illustrates the role that development in high-hazard areas plays in
turning natural hazards into natural disasters! North Carolina
officials estimate that most of the 9,000 homes that suffered major
storm damage were built in floodways or 100-year floodplains In
1. See Peter T. Kilborn, North Carolina Reeling in Hurricane's Aftermath, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 20, 1999, at Al. The problems caused by Floyd's rainfall were exacerbated
by the fact that they came on the heels of 16.5 inches of rain deposited by Tropical Storm
Dennis just two weeks earlier. See David Firestone, High Water Strands 1,000 and Closes
Roads in State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1999, at B5. Ronald Wall of the North Carolina
Division of Emergency Management told reporters, " 'I don't know of anyone who's ever
seen this much rain in North Carolina.'" Id. (quoting Ronald Wall).
2. Firestone, supra note 1, at B5 (quoting Gov. James Hunt).
3. See Lynn Bonner, Lessons in Lives Lost, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Nov. 7, 1999, at 117.
4. See Firestone, supra note 1, at B5.
5. See Irvin Molotsky, Hurricane Is Gone, but North Carolina's Flood Woes Worsen,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,1999, at A24.
6. See James Rosen, More Floyd Relief on the Way, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Feb. 4,2000, at Al. By comparison, Hurricane Fran caused $6 billion in damage in
North Carolina in 1996. See Firestone, supra note 1, at B5.
7. See generally Allison Dunham, Flood Control Via the Police Power, 107 U. PA. L.
REV. 1098,1100 (1959) ("[F]lood losses are caused by man, not nature. If man did not live
and work on the flood plain, there would be no flood losses and no need for construction
of flood prevention works.").
8. See NORTH CAROLINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT Div. ET AL., HAZARD
MITIGATION IN NORTH CAROLINA: MEASURING SuccEss 6 (2000). Floodplains are
measured by the estimated risk of flooding. The area that has a 1% chance of being
covered by water in any given year is referred to as the 100-year floodplain because it
should be submerged only once every 100 years, on average. See Scorr FABER, ON
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addition, the flood swept through twenty-four municipal sewage
treatment plants,9 fifty hog waste lagoons, and three junkyards that
were sited in floodplains ° Millions of acres of the state's natural
wetlands, which absorb flood waters when intact, already had been
ditched and drained for other uses" and offered no buffer against the
flood32 Development in floodplains is not unique to North Carolina,
and the resulting pattern of development suggests that the current
system of siting homes and businesses is deeply flawed.
Although North Carolina and other states cannot reduce the risk
of natural hazards, they can reduce the degree of damage that natural
hazards cause. 3  State and federal agencies already encourage
individuals and public entities to systematically reduce their exposure
to natural hazard risks, a policy known as "hazard mitigation."'14
Unfortunately, state and federal mitigation programs have achieved
only partial success in discouraging development in hazardous areas
because they are ineffective in altering local land use practices. 5 For
example, mitigation efforts have failed in part because even as state
and federal governments have attempted to restrict development,
they have encouraged new growth and reinvestment in hazard-prone
BORROWED LAND: PUBLIC POLICIES FOR FLOODPLAINS 8 (1996). The occurrence of a
100-year flood does not preclude its recurrence even within the same year. Scott Faber
argues, however, that the use of the terms "floodplain" and "100-year flood" misleadingly
represent floods as geographically and temporally predictable events, resulting ifl
overconfidence among those who live in and near flood hazard areas. See FABER, supra,
at 8.
9. See James Eli Shiffer, Toxic Chemicals Foul Waterways, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 28, 1999, at Al.
10. See Ned Glascock et al., Officials Survey Damage, NEwS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Oct. 1, 1999, at A18.
11. These uses included farming, development, and transportation. See James Eli
Shiffer, Forces of Nature and Man, NEWs & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 7, 1999, at
Ill.
12. See id.
13. See DENNIS S. MiLETI, DISASTERS BY DESIGN 27 (1999) ("The choices that are
made about where and how human development will proceed actually determine the
losses that will be suffered in future disasters.").
14. In the wake of Hurricane Fran in 1996, North Carolina bought 1,300 flooded
homes and elevated an additional 700. See Wagner, supra note 8, at A4. The state's goal
was to reduce the number of people and the quantity of privately owned property located
in the path of future floods. See id. Similarly, federal programs, such as the John H.
Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System Act (CBRA), 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-3510 (West
1999), and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (1994),
have attempted to limit development in high-hazard areas by preventing the use of federal
funds or federally backed insurance in such areas. See infra note 49 and accompanying
text (discussing these federal statutes).
15. See DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION 38-54
(1999) [hereinafter GODSCHALK ETAL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION].
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areas by providing infrastructure grants and disaster relief.16
Moreover, mitigation policies at the federal level have achieved
mixed results because federal mitigation efforts since the 1993
Midwest floods have focused on the acquisition and relocation of
property located in high-hazard areas. 7 Acquisition programs are
problematic because they are very expensive and because they leave
the responsibility for land use regulation to local governments. 8 The
combination of these factors is paradoxical: even as the federal
government has assumed greater fiscal responsibility for what
happens in floodplains, it increasingly has relied on methods of
control that are beyond its direct influence.Y The result has been a
16. See idU at 35 ("Federal and state governments provide a host of financial incentives
for hazardous coastal development, including subsidized flood insurance under the NFIP,
disaster assistance ... [and] development monies for highways and infrastructure."); see
also DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION: PUBLIC
NOTIFICATION, EXPENDITURE LIMITATIONS, AND HAZARD AREAS ACQUISITION 39
(1998) [hereinafter GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION] ("Public
subsidies perpetuate an unending cycle of subsidized development, destruction and
subsidized redevelopment."); RUT-ERFORD H. PLATr, DISASTERS AND DEMOCRACY
291 (1999) (analogizing federal disaster policy to "driving with the brakes on" because it
fuels development of hazardous areas through incentives, subsidies, and projects with one
hand, even as it attempts to mitigate future losses with the other).
Federal disaster relief policies and subsidies for reconstruction have been
especially criticized for perpetuating the occupation of hazard-prone properties. See Scott
Allen, Storm Brewing over Disaster Relief, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 20, 1999, at Al (" 'The
broad thrust of federal policy is to provide disaster grants, loans, and tax deductions that
encourage investment in hazardous areas.'" (quoting Professor Platt)). Professor Platt
argues that federal disaster relief initially was necessitated by federal investments that
stimulated private development in hazardous areas. See PLATT, supra, at 11. He
contends, for example, that the decentralized growth encouraged by federal highway and
urban redevelopment programs led to construction in such hazard-prone areas as "stream
valleys, unstable hillsides, accessible forestlands, and coastal shorelines." Id. The ready
availability of public relief creates an insurance effect known as a "moral hazard," in
which landowners accept the risk of building in areas that would go undeveloped if they
faced the true costs of future disasters. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 158 n.1; PLATr,
supra, at 37-41; see also GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION, supra, at
39 ("[Flederal disaster assistance and flood insurance ... ha[ve] facilitated coastal
development by transferring much of the risks and costs of development from the private
sector to the public sector .... The artificially low cost of developing property on coastal
barriers creates a market bias in favor of development .... ).
17. See GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, supra note 15, at 66-
67.
18. See id. at 67. For a history of federal hazard mitigation policy, see generally
PLATr, supra note 16, at 69-99.
19. See NANCY S. PHILIPPI, FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT-ECOLOGICAL AND
ECONOMIC PERSPECrIVES 59-60 (1996) (noting that because of its responsibility for
dispersing disaster relief, the federal government bears the cost of floodplain management
failures while floodplain regulation remains under the control of local governments).
According to Philippi, "[t]he local authority to regulate floodplains continues to be the
pivotal function upon which all else depends." Id. at 60.
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vacuum of accountability that has increased hazard risk.2"
Some commentators have responded to these problems by
calling for limiting federal disaster relief in hazardous areas, 1 but
such spending measures continue to enjoy tremendous political
support.' Taxpayers readily finance disaster rescue and recovery
costs,23 and efforts to impose emergency costs on the victims
themselves remain unpopular.24 Landowners in high-hazard areas,
particularly coastal communities, oppose any transfer of disaster costs
and argue that they already bear much of the cost through their
insurance premiums3O Property insurance, however, is unlikely ever
to displace the demand for federal disaster relief; in practice, many at-
risk property owners do not carry insurance.26 Moreover, there are
20. See PLATr, supra note 16, at xvii.
21. See id. at 291-94; Editorial, Awash in Tax Dollars, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Nov. 11, 1997, at A14 ("[Tihe allocation of hundreds of millions in taxpayer dollars
is exactly what has led the federal government to undermine what state officials have been
trying to do for decades-discourage development in coastal areas that are vulnerable not
just to hurricanes but to heavy storms of any kind."). California, for example, requires
mandatory real estate disclosure statements for property located in a hazard areas to
include a statement that the disclosure "may harm the buyer's ability to receive disaster
relief in the event of a disaster." Steven Tafoya Naumchik, Seller Beware: More Hazard
Disclosure Requirements in the Sale of Real Property, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 713, 717
(1999). This Note does not argue that local government liability should preclude efforts to
transfer the cost of losses to owners who purchase or build with notice of the hazard risk.
22. Between 1988 and 1997, Congress appropriated $30.1 billion in supplemental
funds to pay for disaster relief and recovery. See PLAT, supra note 16, at 24. President
Clinton issued 189 disaster declarations in the fiscal years 1996, 1997, and 1998, a pace of
more than one per week. See id. at 10. Declarations averaged 25 per year from 1984 to
1988, but climbed to an average of 45 per year between 1993 and 1997. See id. at 23. This
increase is attributable to many factors, including high rates of growth along coast lines,
see DAVID R. GODSCHALK ET AL., CATASTROPHIC COASTAL STORMS 2 (1989)
[hereinafter GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL STORMS], and a series of particularly vicious
hazard events, see PLATr, supra note 16, at 22. Commentators also blame the growing
number of declarations on the relative ease with which disasters are declared. See id.
Professor Platt notes that as the number of declaration requests has increased, the
percentage of disaster declarations granted has been increasing as well. See id. Not
surprisingly, the highest approval rates on record were from fiscal years 1992 and 1996, the
most recent presidential election years. See id
23. See David C. McIntyre, Note, Tortfeasor Liability for Disaster Response Costs:
Accounting for the True Cost of Accidents, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 1001,1005 (1987).
24. See id. Such a policy would place the government in the expensive, time-
consuming, and politically untenable position of attempting to recover funds from disaster
victims even as they attempt to piece their lives back together.
25. See GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL STORMS, supra note 22, at 106; Nicholas
Sparks, Editorial, Rebuilding the Coast: Worth Every Cent ... , NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 22, 1999, at A23. Insurance losses, however, also are passed along
to policy holders outside hazard zones through higher premiums and insurance company
defaults. See DAVID M. BUSH ET AL., LIVING BY THE RULES OF THE SEA 4 (1996).
26. See INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE
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costs to reconstruction-in terms of time, energy, natural resources,
and other opportunities surrendered-that far exceed any private or
public insurance reimbursement 7
In contrast to limited disaster relief, a mitigation-driven land use
policy offers a promising approach for reducing hazard losses by
avoiding development in hazard-prone areas. Mitigation-driven
policy is unlikely to be pursued, however, unless those who knowingly
allow private investments in dangerous areas bear the financial
burden of any loss. Federal and state governments traditionally have
retained only a supervisory role over land use decisions,' leaving
local government as the only entity to implement such a policy. Local
governments have largely escaped responsibility for permitting
development on hazard-prone properties even though they are in the
best position to mitigate natural hazard damages through their ability
to oversee directly their land use decisions and through their direct
CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY 131 (1994) (noting
that only between 20% and 30% of the buildings in identified flood hazard areas are
protected by insurance); see also PLATT, supra note 16, at 90 (noting that NFIP insurance
covered only 2% of the damage inflicted by the 1993 Midwest Flood).
27. Hurricane Floyd was estimated to have left at least $1.3 billion in damage to
eastern North Carolina alone, but that figure "doesn't take into account the way the
flood's impact will ripple through the economy." Dudley Price & Rah Bickley, Flood's
Worst Damage Is Invisible, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 26, 1999, at Al.
Unassessed costs include higher unemployment rates, mortgages defaults by workers laid
off from flooded businesses, lower property tax collection rates and lower future
assessments, and lower bond ratings leading to higher public financing costs for
reconstruction. See id. The interdependence of communities means that even those
people who do not suffer major property damage from such disasters "increasingly need to
draw on government resources" in order to recover. MILETI, supra note 13, at 121. For
example, Hurricane Hugo, which struck South Carolina in 1989, elevated welfare rates in
Charleston for years afterward. See Allen, supra note 16, at Al. Debris from that
hurricane also consumed 17 years' worth of landfill space. See id
Disaster victims suffer psychological injuries as well as economic ones. See
Krzysztof Kaniasty & Fran Norris, The Experience of Disaster: Individuals and
Communities Sharing Trauma, in RESPONSE TO DISASTER 25, 40-50 (Richard Gist &
Bernard Lubin eds., 1999). As with economic injuries, psychological harms affect
secondary victims, including the primary victims' neighbors, friends, and relatives. See id.
at 42-43. Although studies show that psychological distress dissipates relatively quickly
following a disaster, it persists longest when victims continue to live in the risk-prone
environment. See Mark S. Salzer & Leonard Bickman, The Short- and Long-Term
Psychological Impact of Disasters: Implications for Mental Health Interventions and
Policy, in RESPONSE TO DISASTER, supra, at 63, 72-73. Studies following a 1972 dam
collapse and flood found evidence of heightened incidence of anxiety and depression
among victims 14 years after the disaster. See id.
28. See Ann Louise Strong et al., Property Rights and Takings, AM. PLAN. ASS'N J.,
Feb. 1996, at 5, 6 (observing that although property "oversight" responsibilities are
divided between the federal and state governments, "local governments ... are the entities
that most frequently and pervasively act to influence the use of private property").
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control over the rate, timing, and location of development.29
Because of this ability to reduce hazard risk, local governments
should be liable for land use decisions that increase the exposure of
people and property to the path of predictable natural hazards. The
Note analyzes two traditional causes of action that could be used to
hold local governments accountable for development decisions. First,
the Note argues that publicly permitted development that increases
hazard risk to adjacent properties or the community at large
constitutes a nuisance for which local governments should be liable.3 °
Second, the Note argues that local governments act negligently when
they permit development in or extend public services to hazard-prone
areas and should be held liable for the resulting damage.31 The Note
then addresses governmental immunity and whether it provides
protection against such claims.32 Finally, the Note addresses policy
issues, concluding that local governments might have overly restricted
their hazard mitigation efforts in reaction to the Supreme Court's
ruling in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal CounciP3 and that imposing
a countervailing liability is necessary to spur mitigation efforts.34
Natural hazards35 in the United States between 1975 and 1995
caused an estimated $500 billion in disaster losses. 36  Although
predicting the occurrence of specific hazard events is difficult-if not
impossible37-congressional and academic studies conducted in the
wake of Hurricane Andrew and the 1993 Midwest floods concluded
that many losses could be avoided through hazard mitigation.38 As a
29. See GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL STORMS, supra note 22, at 40-44 (explaining
development management policies); PmLIPPI, supra note 19, at 70 (noting that although
the states and the federal government encourage mitigation, local governments must
implement mitigation measures).
30. See infra notes 57-89 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 90-165 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 166-85 and accompanying text.
33. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
34. See infra notes 186-231 and accompanying text.
35. Natural hazards are "recurring natural phenomena, such as floods, hurricanes, and
earthquakes." GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, supra note 15, at 4.
This Note addresses intermittent, mappable hazards such as floods, coastal storm surges,
landslides, and, to the extent that fault zones are mappable, earthquakes. Because the
general location of these hazards may be predicted with relative accuracy, they are most
suited to being addressed by land use policies that establish appropriate sites for
development. Non-site-specific hazard measures, such as building codes, are outside the
scope of this Note and are addressed only insofar as they provide analogies for legal or
policy arguments.
36. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 66.
37. See id at 174-89.
3X See GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, supra note 15, at 38-
54 (discussing various studies and critiques). Mitigation is the practice of taking advance
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result, both federal and private organizations increasingly have
turned to mitigation as a means of reducing the costs of disasters? 9
Mitigation techniques can be divided into two categories:
structural techniques, such as dams, levees, and other "armoring" of
land and buildings against anticipated hazards,4 0 and non-structural
techniques, such as land use planning, regulation, and land acquisition
that rely on hazard avoidance.41 Structural techniques have long been
popular because they are intended to reduce the vulnerability of
buildings and populations already present in hazard-prone areas.42
One of the primary criticisms of structural techniques, however, is
that they displace hazard impacts by relocating the effects of hazards
from one location to another.43 For example, coastal jetties capture
sand and build mitigating beaches on their updrift side, but reduce the
width of beaches on adjoining down-drift properties, thereby
subjecting those properties to greater hazard risk.44  Structural
measures also may encourage development in areas adjacent to a
protective structure, thereby resulting in higher losses when the
structure fails.45 By comparison, non-structural mitigation techniques
use growth management measures to limit development in hazard-
prone areas.' Federal and private actors have turned to such
measures because they present a more effective and sustainable
action to avoid or reduce long-term risk to people and property from natural hazard
events. See iL at 5.
39. See id. at 54-67.
40. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 23. Until the 1970s, flood risk was primarily
addressed through such measures. See PLATr, supra note 16, at 70. The wide use of
structural measures persisted despite commentators' long-standing support for alternative
approaches focusing on hazard avoidance. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 7, at 1100
(arguing that by 1959, "the flood control literature ha[d] undergone an almost complete
shift in emphasis from consideration of measures to prevent floods to consideration of
human adjustment to floods").
41. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 24 ("Nonstructural mitigation measures attempt to
distribute the population and the constructed environment such that their exposure to
disaster losses is limited."). Land use planning, land use regulation, and public land
acquisition are typical non-structural techniques. See PLATr, supra note 16, at 70. Flood
hazards in particular have served as a research and development subject for non-structural
mitigation techniques. See id. at 69; see also PHILIPPI, supra note 19, at 47 ("What began
as flood control, controlling floods by building structures to contain them, has broadened
to include floodplain management, controlling and restricting the uses of our
floodplains."). For a discussion of the history of nonstructural hazard mitigation, see
generally PLATT, supra note 16, at 74-102.
42. See GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL STORMS, supra note 22, at 25.
43. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 25 (arguing that many structural mitigation
techniques do not prevent hazard damage, but merely relocate it).
44. See BUSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 24.
45. See PILIPPI, supra note 19, at 76.
46. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 24.
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solution to natural hazard risk over the long term.47
Over the past thirty years, a variety of federal programs have
advocated non-structural methods of avoiding hazardsA Typically,
under the rules of these programs, states and local governments must
undertake mitigation efforts as a condition of receiving federal funds
or subsidies.49 In the past decade, Congress has conditioned the
receipt of some federal disaster funds on the implementation of state
and local mitigation programs.50 Observers, however, note that this
particular approach has achieved only modest success.5 1 In reality,
even though the federal government funds post-disaster
reconstruction, it has little effective control over the use of that
money to limit the recurrence of such disasters 2 In order to break
47. See id. at 155-56 ("No single approach to bringing sustainable hazard mitigation
into existence shows more promise at this time than increased use of sound and equitable
land use management."). For a discussion of sustainable hazard mitigation, see generally
id. at 30-35, and GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION, supra note 15, at
525-51.
48. See PLATr, supra note 16, at 71. For example, the National Flood Insurance
Program promotes at least four mitigation tools: floodplain mapping, minimum
construction standards for floodplains, mandatory insurance, and public acquisition of
flood-prone properties. See id. at 77.
49. For example, the National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129
(1994), and the John H. Chafee Coastal Barrier Resources System Act, 16 U.S.C.A.
§§ 3501-3510 (Supp. 1999), were designed to reduce development in high-hazard areas.
See 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e); 16 U.S.C.A. § 3501(b). The NFIP relies heavily on incentives to
encourage local land use controls. See Alexandra D. Dawson, Land Use Implications of
Wetland and Floodplain Regulation, in 1982 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK
235, 244 (Fredric A. Strom ed., 1982). The program is designed as a quid pro quo: the
federal government offers flood insurance in return for a degree of local management over
floodplain development. See id. at 243. The NFIP is lightly subscribed. See PLATT, supra
note 16, at 30 (noting that only 20% to 25% of all flood-prone properties are covered
under the program). The NFIP's effectiveness has been further circumscribed by the fact
that it is "notoriously" willing to continue insuring structures that are damaged repeatedly,
often without an increase in the insurance premium. Id. at 31 (reporting that 40% of all
NFIP payments, totaling $2.58 billion, have been for repetitive loss properties). The result
is that the program is perceived as "equivalent to an 'entitlement'" for some property
owners. Id. at 32. In contrast with the NFIP, CBRA prohibits new flood insurance
coverage and limits federal infrastructure expenditures in designated at-risk areas
regardless of local mitigation activities. See id at 81. CBRA has been undermined,
however, because it does not limit federal expenditures for barrier islands that already
were developed or developing at the time of its passage. See id.
50. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 5121-5204(c) (1994), which Congress passed in 1988, requires that a portion of all
disaster relief funds be reserved for projects that mitigate the effects of natural hazards.
See id. § 5121.
51. The first comprehensive study of the Act concludes that it has had limited
effectiveness in reducing hazard damages. See GODSCHALK ET AL., NATURAL HAZARD
MITGATION, supra note 15, at 425-31.
52. See PLATr, supra note 16, at 93 (noting "a discontinuity between the rising level of
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the cycle of reconstruction status quo ante, local governments must
be successfully encouraged to adopt mitigation plans and policies. 3
Local governments may engage in non-structural mitigation in
three ways. First, local governments can avoid siting public
amenities, such as fire and police stations, schools, and wastewater
treatment facilities, in hazard-prone locations 4 Second, local
governments can avoid siting local infrastructure in high-hazard areas
because doing so encourages the development of these areas."
Finally, local governments can limit or prohibit the development of
hazard-prone areas through zoning, setbacks, subdivision ordinances,
and other development restrictions. 6
When local governments fail to take such measures, they imply
that hazardous areas are "safe" for private development. Home and
business owners rely on local governments to regulate the safety of
development, so they settle near public amenities and infrastructure
without realizing that they have placed themselves in harm's way.
Although local governments have not been accountable to the federal
government for actions encouraging hazardous development, this
Note argues that courts can and should hold them liable to property
owners by adapting two traditional causes of action to development
and hazard mitigation decisions.
The first cause of action-nuisance-involves a use of real
property that causes harm to neighboring landowners North
Carolina courts have defined nuisance as a "substantial non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of property" that substantially affects the "'health,
comfort or property of those who live near[by].' "58 Applying this
federal fiscal liability for disaster costs and the diminishing extent of federal political
influence over development decisions that affect hazard vulnerability").
53. See id. at 71.
54. See FABER, supra note 8, at 10 (arguing that local governments should set an
example by not siting public facilities in high-hazard areas); GODSCHALK ET AL.,
COASTAL STORMS, supra note 22, at 177-80 (explaining that coastal development is highly
influenced by capital facilities, such as roads, sewers, and water service). Twenty-four
North Carolina wastewater treatment plants were flooded by Hurricane Floyd. See Alan
Scher Zagier, Deluged, PLANNING, Feb. 2000, at 8,10.
55. See GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL STORMS, supra note 22, at 177-80 (explaining
how a locality can develop an explicit set of capital facilities extension policies designed to
avoid high-hazard areas).
56. See id at 167-71 (noting that hazard mitigation plans must be accompanied by
development regulations in order to be effective).
57. See City of Lawrenceville v. Heard, 391 S.E.2d 441, 443-44 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
58. Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co., 256 N.C. 611,617, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813-14 (1962) (quoting
Pake v. Morris, 230 N.C. 424,436,53 S.E.2d 300,301 (1949)).
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definition, the development of hazardous areas can be deemed a
nuisance when it increases physical or economic risks to adjacent
properties. Although traditional nuisance claims have focused on
physical invasions of neighboring property, there is a strong argument
in the hazardous areas context that recovery for a nuisance also
should be allowed for non-property losses. Such losses include
economic harms for increased disaster rescue and recovery costs
necessitated by hazard-prone development and economic harms that
occur long after the initial development.
The inequitable diversion of costs and damage from one
property to another that nuisance law is intended to prevent is
particularly evident in floodplains, where individual developments
pose a future hazard to both their immediate and downstream
neighbors as a result of the physical proximity of the properties 9
First, there is the risk of physical damage being caused by debris
swept loose in a flood.60 Second, and more significantly, upstream
development raises flood levels on downstream properties by
reducing the capacity of the floodplain to absorb water at its historical
rate.6' Scott Faber, the director of floodplain programs at the
nonprofit conservation organization American Rivers in Washington,
D.C., describes the 100-year flood as a bag containing 99 clear
marbles and one black marble.62 Each year a local jurisdiction has the
same chance of pulling the black marble from the bag.63 But the
effect of floodplain development, Faber writes, is to increase the
number of black marbles: "Anyone who fills a wetland, improves
field drainage, builds or raises a levee, paves a parking lot, or
channels a stream is essentially pulling out a clear marble and
returning a black one, gradually increasing everyone's chances of
59. See Turner v. Del Norte, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93, 96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (recognizing
that buildings in the floodplain raise flood levels, posing a risk to buildings outside the
current floodplain); Usdin v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Div. of Water Resources,
414 A.2d 280, 290 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (finding that floodplain regulation was
justified in part by the injuries that could result from floodplain development, including
"injury to onsite property, injury to offsite persons or property in the downstream path of
the debris from a wrongful development, and injury to community members who drink or
use water contaminated by inappropriate onsite development"); see also DANIEL
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 12.05, at 485 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that building in the
floodplain raises flood levels, thus posing risks to an increased number of buildings).
60. See Usdin, 414 A.2d at 290.
61. See Turner, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (recognizing that buildings in the floodplain raise
flood levels, posing a risk to buildings outside the current floodplain); MANDELKER, supra
note 59, § 12.05, at 485 (same).
62. See FABER, supra note 8, at 9.
63. See id. The black marble goes back in the bag after it has been pulled, making it
possible to have hundred-year floods several years in a row. See iL
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getting a black marble." 6 Increasing the number of black marbles
results in two classes of potential plaintiffs who suffer from upstream
development: those whose properties suffer increased flooding and
those whose properties are newly subjected to floodwaters.
Accordingly, two types of recovery should be available under a
nuisance cause of action. First, a property owner who sustains actual
damages caused or exacerbated by property a local government
permitted in a floodplain should be able to recover those actual
damages. Second, because the harm associated with floodplain
development does not manifest itself until some time after the
development is completed, property owners who are likely to suffer
substantial interference with their property from this development
should also be allowed to seek injunctive relief against the local
government to prevent such development.
Under current law, governments are liable for actual damages
sustained by a property owner if the government either created or
contributed to a nuisance.' A number of courts have held that
"governmental licensing of businesses, activities[,] or land uses ...
[that] create[s] or maintain[s] a nuisance" is enough to create such
liability.66 For example, the Georgia Court of Appeals has held a
municipality liable for approving development that increased water
runoff onto adjacent properties. In City of Lawrenceville v. Heard,67
the City of Lawrenceville approved development on a slope uphill
from the plaintiffs' home.68 The uphill development appeared to be
the cause of significant water runoff, which washed through the
64. Iti
65. Local governments are not immune to suit for nuisances. See, e.g., Columbus, Ga.
v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d 761, 766 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984); see also 1 CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST
STATE AND LOCAL GOvERNMENT, ITS DMSIONS, AGENCIES, AND OFFICERS § 1.22, at
76-77 (Jon L. Craig ed., 2ded. 1992) [hereinafter CIVIL ACrIONS] ("The rationale is that a
governmental entity has no more right to create and maintain a nuisance than a private
individual." (citing Board of Educ. v. Riverdale, 578 A.2d 207,210-11 (Md. 1990))).
66. 2 JOHN W. SHONKWILER & TERRY MORGAN, LAND USE LITIGATION § 27.05, at
285; see also Frustruck v. Fairfax, 28 Cal. Rptr. 357,367 (Cal. Ct. App. 1963) (noting that a
city's liability "is not necessarily predicated upon ... the actual physical act of diversion"
and that "[t]he basis of the liability is its failure, in the exercise of its governmental power,
to appreciate the probability that the drainage system ... would result in some damage to
private property"); Lukas v. New Haven, 439 A.2d 949, 952 (Conn. 1981) (noting that a
municipality will be liable for creating a nuisance through some positive act); Columbus,
Ga., 316 S.E.2d at 766 (holding the City liable for approving development that increased
runoff and flooded plaintiffs' property). See generally 19 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 53.59.40 (3d ed. rev. 1994) (surveying municipal liability for the
creation or maintenance of nuisances).
67. 391 S.E.2d 441 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
68. See id. at 442.
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plaintiffs' backyard and flooded their basement.69 The court held that
the increased water levels constituted a nuisance and agreed that the
City was liable.70
Under the rationale espoused in Lawrenceville, a municipality
would also be liable for approving development in hazardous areas.
Much like uphill development, upstream development has a clear,
predictable impact on future flooding. When such flooding invades
downstream residents' properties and causes significant damage,
those residents experience a substantial invasion of the use and
enjoyment of their property within the traditional understanding of
nuisance law.
Local governments' liability might even be stretched beyond the
traditional limits of nuisance law to account for the unusual economic
and temporal aspects of natural disasters.7' Nuisance law traditionally
has focused on remedying direct physical harm to property.7 2 Several
unique characteristics of natural hazards, however, provide a strong
argument for also allowing injunctive relief for prospective or
economic harms against local governments that permit development
in hazard-prone areas. For instance, the most serious damage caused
by development-related flooding is not the temporary interference
with the use and enjoyment of a property owner's land, but rather,
the long-term economic damage left behind.73 Moreover, the
economic damage may occur years after upstream development is
completed, depending on the timing of storms. These problems
69. See id. at 443.
70. Id. at 443-44.
71. Nuisance law has traditionally been a flexible doctrine that has been "given an
expansive meaning by the courts." 2 SHONKVILER & MORGAN, supra note 66, § 27.05, at
284; see also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258
Cal. Rptr. 893, 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that nuisance law has "been applied by
the Court to uphold prohibitions against a broad range of other uses of one's property").
Although nuisance law recognizes a landowner's right to put her land to productive use,
see Aaron M. McKown, Note, Hog Farms and Nuisance Law in Parker v. Barefoot: Has
North Carolina Become a Hog Heaven and Waste Lagoon?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 2355, 2361
(1999), it assures neighboring property owners the right to be free from any substantial
interference with the use and enjoyment of their property. See Watts v. Pama Mfg. Co.,
256 N.C. 611, 617, 124 S.E.2d 809, 813-14 (1962). These principles apply whether the
problematic use is one that is actively dangerous or whether it is merely unpleasant or
undesirable. Compare M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (applying the nuisance exception to the takings doctrine when federal officials
ordered a stop to mining operations that caused dangerous subsidence of the surface), with
City of Birmingham v. Scogin, 115 So. 2d 505, 514 (Ala. 1959) (requiring the defendant
city to reduce odors from a landfill).
72. See MANDELKER, supra note 59, § 4.02, at 99.
73. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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suggest that courts need to be flexible if they are to provide property
owners with any meaningful relief. Nuisance law should, by analogy
to the instances of direct physical harm, provide a cause of action
when a local government approves a hazardous land use, even though
the harms to be remedied are prospective or largely economic.
Injunctive relief is the only appropriate remedy for prospective
economic harms because no actual damages have occurred at the time
the relief is sought. In practice, however, courts typically deny
injunctive relief when plaintiffs claim that a legal use of a property
will cause prospective harm to their property.7 4 A court will
presume-until a plaintiff can demonstrate otherwise as a result of
experience-that a legal land use can be performed in a manner that
does not substantially interfere with the use and enjoyment of other
properties. Moreover, to obtain injunctive relief, plaintiffs must
demonstrate a diminution in value of their property that results from
the nuisance.76 Plaintiffs may obtain injunctive relief, however, to
prevent a prospective harm when they can demonstrate an immediate
danger or an irreparable injury.' Courts should be flexible in
applying this standard in cases of hazard-prone development in order
to facilitate the granting of injunctive relief. Courts should also
74. See Wilcher v. Sharpe, 236 N.C. 308, 312, 72 S.E.2d 662, 665 (1952) (denying an
injunction to prevent the construction of a grain mill based on the plaintiffs claims that the
mill would cause noise and dust that would interfere with the use and enjoyment of their
homes); Dorsett v. Group Dev. Corp., 2 N.C. App. 120, 125, 162 S.E.2d 653, 656 (1968)
(upholding the denial of a temporary injunction against the construction of an asphalt
plant).
Legal uses of property that are not nuisances per se may become nuisances per
accidens by virtue of their location. See Duffy v. E.H. & J. A. Meadows Co., 131 N.C. 31,
33, 42 S.E. 460, 461 (1902). This Note argues that development becomes a nuisance per
accidens when it occurs in the floodplain. Although courts prefer that plaintiffs seek
remedies for nuisances per accidens only when actual damages have been inflicted, see
Wilcher, 236 N.C. at 311, 72 S.E.2d at 664, the denial of injunctive relief for a prospective
harm does not preclude a subsequent cause of action for actual damages, see id. at 312,
313, 72 S.E.2d at 665.
75. See Wilcher, 236 N.C. at 311,72 S.E.2d at 664.
76. See, e.g., Redd v. Edna Cotton Mills, 136 N.C. 342, 343, 48 S.E. 761, 762 (1904)
(declining to enjoin a factory from blowing whistle blasts in the early morning and late
evening in part because the jury apparently found that the noise had not impaired
property values).
77. See Hooks v. International Speedways, Inc., 263 N.C. 686, 692, 140 S.E.2d 387,392
(1965) (upholding a temporary injunction against the construction of a race track within
2500 feet of a rural church); Causby v. High Penn Oil Co., 244 N.C. 235, 240, 241, 93
S.E.2d 79, 83, 84 (1956) (holding that replacing an oil refinery that had previously
amounted to a nuisance with another refinery of the same type was certain to create
another nuisance and noting that "[e]quity does not require a man to stand idle, until his
family has sickened or died"); Cherry v. Williams, 147 N.C. 452, 461, 61 S.E. 267, 270-71
(1908) (upholding an injunction to restrain the construction of a tuberculosis hospital).
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recognize that some largely economic harms, such as increased costs
for disaster recovery and reconstruction, will not be reflected in
diminished property values. Adjacent property owners should be
able to seek injunctive relief to prevent development in the floodplain
when new structures are likely to increase the risk of future flooding
to their properties or to impose significant disaster recovery costs."
A cause of action for prospective and largely economic harms would
broaden the definition of nuisance by equating these harms with a
substantial interference of private property.
Although courts are more apt to find a nuisance when there has
been a physical invasion of a plaintiff's property (such as when
pollution from a neighboring use drifts onto her property), a physical
invasion is not necessary.79 Indeed, many land use regulations
restricting noxious uses hinge on the fact that development merely
increases the risk of harm to neighbors."0 In announcing the nuisance
exception to the Takings Clause in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, identified a
prospective harm that the government could address as a present
nuisance."' Justice Scalia noted hypothetically that a nuclear power
plant that is sited on a fault line would constitute a nuisance despite
the fact that the plant would cause no damage to its neighbors until
the fault line beneath it triggered a disaster.2 The nuisance that is
avoided by prohibiting or relocating the plant is not a present threat
that causes repetitive damage, as in the Lawrenceville storm runoff
case, but instead, is the risk of unreasonable future damage.
Similarly, liability should attach to government decisions that license
or permit development posing a reasonably predictable risk of
creating unreasonable future interference with neighboring
property.
If courts decided to recognize prospective and economic harms
78. An injunction allows the parties to determine the full extent of the harm and to
investigate steps to mitigate that harm.
79. See MANDELKER, supra note 59, § 4.02, at 99. In many hazard cases the dispute is
over the threat of future physical invasions.
80. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 770-71 (Wis. 1972); see also
MANDELKER, supra note 59, § 12.05, at 485 ("Development in floodplains increases the
flooding danger by diminishing the carrying capacity of the floodplain. This causal
relationship between floodplain development and flood danger provides an important
basis for upholding restrictive floodplain regulations against taking objections.").
81. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
82. See id
83. Likewise, when the government acts to prohibit or to restrict hazardous uses on
the basis of their danger to the public, it should be liable for subsequently failing to
enforce its rules and policies.
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as nuisances, they would then have to decide whether non-physical
harms in specific hazardous area cases constituted a "substantial"
interference. Courts have occasionally recognized that hazardous
land uses reach the threshold of substantial interference with
neighboring properties when such uses create a risk of physical
harm. 4 Plaintiffs whose property is subjected to a heightened risk of
future flooding suffer the same interference with the use and
enjoyment of their property as those who are subject to repeated
flooding. They face the same fear of losing people or property to
rising water and flood-borne debris. They also share in the economic
and social harms that a disaster inflicts on their community in general,
including the costs of disaster recovery.85
One state court has adopted an expanded definition of
substantial interference that recognizes as a nuisance any activity that
would increase the amount of public expenditures to remedy the
effect of such activities. In Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham,86
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld floodplain
regulations against a takings challenge in part because hazard-prone
development imposes public costs for disaster recovery. 87
Specifically, the court held that development in the floodplain
increases the risk of harm to the entire community by exposing it to
"individual choices of land use [that] require subsequent public
expenditures for public works and disaster relief. ' The court held,
in part because these greater public costs for disaster relief and
recovery constitute substantial non-physical interference with the
community at large, that land uses that would increase those costs
could be regulated without compensation to the affected
landowners.89
Although Turnpike Realty provides an ideal model that courts
should follow in liberally construing "substantial interference," courts
need not adopt Turnpike Realty in order to determine that
development in high-hazard areas constitutes a substantial
interference. If those who stand to share in the common costs of a
disaster are allowed to prevent development that would raise those
84. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 258 Cal.
Rptr. 893, 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Usdin v. State, 414 A.2d 280, 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1980).
85. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
86. 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972).
87. See id. at 899.
88. Id. at 896.
89. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891,899 (Mass. 1972).
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costs, a homeowner who suffers exemplary risk as a result of that
development should be able to recover for the nuisance created. By
acknowledging that the risk of physical harm will result in a
substantial interference, courts could hold local governments
accountable for permitting such development. Even though
recognizing nuisance liability will not reduce the future damage to
individual property owners in the short term, over the long term, it
would stem the perpetuation of hazard risk that results when local
governments allow property owners to build in high-hazard areas or
to restore damaged properties in high-hazard areas to their previously
vulnerable state. Presumably, local governments that foresee being
held liable for development in high-hazard areas wil be less likely to
permit such development.
A second cause of action that could be used to hold local
governments accountable for their development decisions is based on
a theory of negligence. Unlike nuisance, liability under this theory
would not depend on whether a local government has created or
contributed to hazardous development. Instead, courts would have to
determine whether local governments owe residents a duty to act
reasonably to limit exposure to hazards of which the government has
actual or constructive notice. 0 More importantly, negligence would
allow relief for individuals who not only build outside hazardous
areas and are flooded, but also for those who build in hazardous areas
and do not realize the risk of such development because of their
reliance on local governments' implicit assurances of safety.
The key issue in negligence claims is whether a duty exists. In
general, local governments are held liable only for misfeasance, or
acting unreasonably, but not for nonfeasance, or for failing to act at
all.91 A duty usually arises with respect to local governments by virtue
of the municipalities' control over hazards, as is the case with
dangerous roads. Absent control, a local government may assume a
duty to prevent harm or to warn of hazards if it takes actions that
cause others to reasonably believe that the local government has
90. See Georges v. Tudor, 556 P.2d 564, 566 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976). The essential
elements of a negligence cause of action are: a duty of care owed, a breach of that duty,
causation, and damages. See iL
91. See City of Pritchard v. Lasner, 406 So. 2d 990, 992 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)
(indicating that a city cannot be held liable for failing to exercise its authority to construct
drainage); Coffey v. City of Berkeley, 149 P. 559, 560 (Cal. 1915) (holding that the City
was under no duty to build a bridge across a dangerous stream bank); Hayashi v. Alameda
County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist., 334 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959) (noting that "it is probably the law that a flood district is under no enforceable
obligation to build levees or other public improvements to keep out floods").
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taken responsibility for policing the problem.92 Although courts have
not applied these general principles to the question of damage from
private development in high-hazard areas, the general principles of
negligence suggest that local governments can be held liable for
failing to act reasonably in encouraging and regulating such
development.
Once a duty is determined to exist, a related issue is the standard
of care courts should adopt in evaluating whether a local government
has satisfied its duty. Local governments should not be judged
against their peer governments because few have undertaken serious
mitigation efforts. Rather, they should be judged by analogy to the
instances in which local governments have been held to the standard
of care as a reasonably prudent individual. Local governments are
expected to act like reasonably prudent individuals in their role as
landowners93 and in providing public amenities such as streets,94 sewer
services,95 and utilities. 6 In these instances, the public is entitled to
rely on the safety of facilities that the government operates and
controls as if they were provided by a private party.97 For example, in
Hayashi v. Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conservation
District,98 the plaintiff alleged that the district had failed to repair a
levee that had broken following a heavy rain.99 The plaintiff
92. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,241 (Alaska 1976).
93. See Hayashi v. Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist., 334
P.2d 1048,1053 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding the local government entity liable for failing
to maintain a levee that it had constructed on its property).
94. See, e.g., Tyler v. Richmond, 191 S.E. 625, 627 (Va. 1937) (holding that although
pedestrians must exercise "ordinary care," they are ordinarily entitled to assume that a
sidewalk is unobstructed); 19 MCQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 54.122, at 553 ("In the absence
of knowledge to the contrary, persons using a street or sidewalk have a right to presume
... that the way is reasonably safe for ordinary travel .... "). In the majority of
jurisdictions, local government liability for unsafe streets is based on a common law duty
to maintain the roads. See id § 54.02, at 46. Other jurisdictions infer a duty to maintain
safe roads from the municipality's general control over roads. See id § 54.03.20, at 54. In
a few jurisdictions the duty to provide safe roads has been created by statute. See id
§ 54.05, at 59. For a discussion of the governmental duty to ensure safe roads, see
generally FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., 5 THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.7, at 643-53 (1986).
95. See, e.g., 18A MCQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 53.125, at 236 (citing to cases from
more than 20 states).
96. See, e.g., City of Wichita Falls v. Lipscomb, 50 S.W.2d 867, 872 (Tex. Civ. App.
1932) (recognizing municipal liability for negligence relating to a local government's
provision of water service).
97. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TiE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER & PUBLIC
POLICY 89 (1977) ("[lit seems reasonable that the citizen expect a level of government
responsibility for his safety that accords with the standard for comparable activities in
which private enterprise undertakes the management of hazardous clusters of energy.").
98. 334 P.2d 1048 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
99. See id at 1049.
2000] 1551
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
repeatedly notified district officials of the break, but the district failed
to repair the levee, leading to subsequent damage of the plaintiff's
property on two occasions. 1 0 The court held that the district was
under the same duty as a private landowner to maintain the levee in a
reasonable manner and was therefore obligated to prevent the danger
from materializing.'0' Given the abnormal risk that government
activities with regard to hazards may pose to public safety,
governments should not be held to a lesser standard of care than the
reasonably prudent individual.
To be held liable for dangerous conditions within its control, a
government must have had actual or constructive notice of the
dangerous condition and have failed, within a sufficient time, to
remedy the problem.' 2 In the case of roads, notice of a dangerous
condition can be established by showing that the government was or
should have been aware of the hazard, either by having created it"a3 or
by the passage of time sufficient to allow its discovery.' 4 Generally,
courts have concluded that actual notice exists when a resident
explicitly notifies the responsible entity of the hazard, such as when a
landowner brings a hazardous situation to the attention of the local
government.05 Liability attaches if the government then fails to act as
a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances by failing to
mitigate the hazard. 06
Even absent an express duty to safeguard or warn the public,
local government may assume a duty to do so through certain
actions.'0 Under present law, a local government may be held liable
for breaching a duty assumed when it takes actions that place third
parties at risk of injury or otherwise induces reliance by third
parties.1' Liability often results if the victim forgoes protecting
100. See id.
101. See id. at 1053.
102. See, e.g., Bowman v. Town of Granite Falls, 21 N.C. App. 333,334,204 S.E.2d 239,
240-41 (1974) (stating that a municipality's notice of a defect and its failure to remedy it
are required for recovery in negligence); 19 MCQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 54.102, at 441.
In some jurisdictions, notice requirements are determined by state statute. See 1 CIVIL
ACrIONS, supra note 65, § 3.27, at 285-87.
103. See, e.g., Hughes v. Jahoda, 553 N.E.2d 1015, 1016-17 (N.Y. 1990) (mem.)
(holding that notice of a dangerous condition was not required when the town had placed
a utility pole too close to the roadway).
104. See, e.g., 19 McQuiLLIN, supra note 66, § 54.102, at 441 (citing more than 40
cases).
105. See, e.g., Hayashi, 334 P.2d at 1052.
106. See, e.g., Maloney v. City of Grand Forks, 15 N.W.2d 769, 773 (N.D. 1944); 5
HARPER ET AL., supra note 97, § 29.7, at 651.
107. See 2 SHONKWILER & MORGAN, supra note 66, § 27.02, at 277.
108. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955); City of
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herself in favor of reasonably relying on another-such as a local
government-to address a hazardous situation.109 Such reliance on
the government is reasonable if the government provides some
assurance of safety by its efforts to mitigate a risk. In City of
Pritchard v. Lasner,"0 for example, the Alabama Court of Appeals
held the City liable for flood damage that resulted when it stopped
maintaining a drainage ditch adjacent to the plaintiffs property."'
The court reasoned that the City had assumed a duty to maintain the
drainage ditch by repeatedly cleaning it in the past."2 The court
noted that although the City may not have initially had a duty to keep
the ditch clear, it assumed that responsibility once it undertook to do
so and was liable for flooding that resulted when it ceased to maintain
the ditch."3
An assumption of duty more typically arises with respect to
hazards when a municipality is charged with enforcing an ordinance
or enforcing mandatory statutory requirements that are designed to
ensure public safety."4 A cause of action in these circumstances is
founded on the notion that an injured party reasonably relied to his
detriment on the public entity's express or implied assurances." The
courts have recognized two broad categories of safety assurances that
justify reasonable reliance by the public: a government's affirmative
act to warn of a public danger"l6 and a government's affirmative
attempt to reduce a danger by enforcing minimum standards." 7
In the first broad category of cases, an affirmative act to warn of
a public danger will result in liability if it is performed negligently." 8
In Indian Towing Co. v. United States,"9 for instance, a lighthouse
operated by the Coast Guard failed, causing a tugboat and barge
Pritchard v. Lasner, 406 So. 2d 990, 992 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981); Adams v. State, 555 P.2d
235, 240 (Alaska 1976); Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 545 P.2d 13, 18 (Wash. 1975) (en
banc).
109. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965); cf Sheridan v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 100 P.2d 1024, 1031 (Wash. 1940) (holding hotel owners not liable for
failure to inspect hotel elevators when they had relied on the defendant insurance
company's voluntary promise to make such inspections).
110. 406 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
111. See id. at 992.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See 2 SHONKWILER & MORGAN, supra note 66, § 27.02, at 277.
115. See 19 MCQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 54.122, at 533-34.
116. See, e.g., Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955).
117. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,240 (Alaska 1976).
118. See Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 64-65; Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 545 P.2d 13,
18 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
119. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
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operated by the towing company to run aground.12 0 The Supreme
Court held that when the Coast Guard undertakes to provide a
lighthouse, it has a duty to maintain that lighthouse in working
order.121 Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter stated that "it is
hornbook tort law that one who undertakes to warn the public of
danger and thereby induces reliance must perform his 'good
Samaritan' task in a careful manner."'2 The Supreme Court of
Washington echoed this holding in Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc.,'23 in
which the State had failed to publicly announce an avalanche
124Anoeewarning. A noted expert had warned the State about the risk of an
avalanche on the plaintiff's property.125 The State led the expert to
believe that it would pass his information along to the parties at risk,
but failed to do so.26 The court held that if the State leads others to
believe that it will notify a party, then the State assumes a duty to
warn that party.'2 If the State then fails to exercise reasonable care
in issuing the warning, either by giving an insufficient or inaccurate
warning or by failing to issue the warning altogether, the State is
liable for the plaintiffs' otherwise avoidable injuries. 12
The second broad category giving rise to an assumption of duty is
when a governmental entity affirmatively attempts to reduce a danger
by enforcing minimum safety standards. While the majority of
jurisdictions have held that municipalities are not liable for
negligently inspecting structures for compliance with safety
standards,12 9 some courts have held that once a governmental agency
undertakes an inspection, it is under a duty to follow through in a
reasonable manner.3 ' In Adams v. State,'3 for example, the victims
120. See id. at 62.
121. See id at 69.
122. Id at 64-65.
123. 545 P.2d 13 (Wash. 1975) (en banc).
124. See id at 15.
125. See id. at 17.
126. See id. The State apparently misinformed the real estate developer of the extent
of the avalanche risk and did not inform the plaintiff, a subsequent purchaser, at all. See
id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 18-19.
129. See, e.g., Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. 1991); Modlin v.
City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70,76 (Fla. 1967); Hannon v. Counihan, 369 N.E.2d 917,
921-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc. 199 N.W.2d 158,
159-60 (Minn. 1972); Georges v. Tudor, 556 P.2d 564,566 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976).
130. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,240 (Alaska 1976) (holding that after inspecting
and discovering fire hazards, "the state fire officials had a duty to proceed further with
regard to the recognized hazards"); Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 673-74 (Iowa
1979) ("Municipalities are not going to be motivated toward meaningful inspections while
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of a hotel fire sued the State of Alaska for the negligent enforcement
of its fire code.32 The plaintiffs alleged that state inspectors had
examined the hotel more than eight months before the fire and had
uncovered several serious hazards, including a non-functioning alarm
system. 33 Despite having full notice that the building failed to meet
minimum safety codes, the State failed to inform the hotel owners of
the specific violations.M The Alaska Supreme Court held that by
undertaking to inspect the hotel, the State assumed a duty to ensure
that its minimum safety codes were met and then breached that duty
by taking no further action after discovering dangerous fire
conditions at the hotel. 35 The court concluded that the plaintiffs, as
users of the hotel, were the intended beneficiaries of the safety
standards and the foreseeable victims of a fire.136 Therefore, the State
was liable to them for breaching its duty.37
Local governments fulfill their duty to protect against some
hazardous activities by providing notice of a hazard risk to those
endangered by it. 3' For example, if a government builds a road with
a curve that it knows can be negotiated safely only at a certain slow
insulated from their employees' negligence with respect to these statutory duties [to
inspect]."); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 247 N.W.2d 132, 139 (Wis. 1976) (observing that
once an inspection is undertaken, "a duty to exercise reasonable care in so doing" arises);
see also Hawes v. Germantown Mut. Ins. Co., 309 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981)
("Public policy does not preclude municipal liability for approval of plans and construction
containing specific code violations where the injury is directly attributable to easily
discoverable violations.").
131. 555 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1976).
132. See icL at 236-37.
133. See id. at 238-39.
134. See id. at 239.
135. See id.; see also SHApO, supra note 97, at 96 ("[WMhen government undertakes an
inspection, it should be liable for failure to follow up on discovered hazards when a
prudent private person in possession of that knowledge and endowed with comparable
expertise would seek corrective action."). The Adams court distinguished the case from
instances in which no hazard is discovered during a routine inspection. 555 P.2d at 240.
The court went on to hold, however, that the state has a duty to exercise reasonable care
to discover fire hazards during inspections. See id. at 240-41. This extension of liability is
reasonable because the third party relies on governmental action without regard to
whether the hazard was discovered and neglected or was mistakenly overlooked. But see
Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70, 76 (Fla. 1967) (holding that the negligent
failure of an inspector to discover the danger that a building may collapse did not result in
municipal liability).
136. See Adams, 555 P.2d at 241.
137. See id.
138. See generally 1 CIVIL AcInONs, supra note 65, § 3.25, at 279 (observing that
liability under tort statutes may attach for failing to warn of dangerous roadway
conditions); id., § 2.13, at 137 (noting that the decision to warn or not warn of a road
hazard is not protected by discretionary function immunity); id., § 2.12, at 132 (noting
obligation to warn potential victims of a dangerous individual's release from custody).
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speed, it has a duty to post a warning to motorists.'39 The duty arises
because in the absence of the warning, drivers are entitled to assume
that the road is safe to be traveled at the customary speed. 40
Generally, the duty to warn is limited to instances in which a
governmental entity either has created or controlled the dangerous
condition and had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard. 4'
Although a governmental entity may assume that motorists and
pedestrians will avoid most obvious hazards," municipalities are
nonetheless required to mitigate preemptively those roadway dangers
that reasonably may be anticipated to arise. 143 In cases when dangers
are obvious, most courts will hold local governments liable for failing
to warn, but will reduce the amount of recovery to account for the
plaintiff's knowledge of the hazard.'"
139. See Department of Trans. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071, 1078 (Fla. 1982). In
Neilson, the Supreme Court of Florida held that governmental entities cannot be held
liable for maintaining dangerous intersections because the placement of roads and traffic
signals is protected by the discretionary function immunity. See id. at 1077-78; see also
infra notes 173, 176 (discussing the discretionary function immunity). The court noted,
however, that the immunity is curtailed when the governmental entity knows that a road
design is inherently dangerous. See i. at 1078. In such circumstances, the government is
under an obligation to warn of the danger. See id Thus, because the failure to warn of a
known danger is an operational level omission, a government will not be afforded relief
under the discretionary function immunity. See id.
140. See SHAPO, supra note 97, at 88 ("A dangerous section of highway without the
most specific warnings implicitly signals that it is safe for travel at generally accepted
standards of motoring behavior.").
141. See I CIVIL ACTIONS, supra note 65, § 2.8, at 120-22. With regard to roads,
however, the government may be responsible for hazards that endanger motorists even if
the danger arises from property not under its control. See Brown v. State, 58 N.Y.S.2d
691, 692 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1945) ("The State is obligated to maintain its highways in a safe
condition for travel, not only with regard to obstructions and defects ... , but also with
regard to conditions adjacent to and above the highway which might reasonably be
anticipated to result in injury and damage to the users thereof."); Ford v. South Carolina
Dep't of Tramp., 492 S.E.2d 811, 814 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the State of South
Carolina "has a duty to use reasonable care to keep streets and highways within its control
in a reasonably safe condition for public travel"). But see Bowman v. Town of Granite
Falls, 21 N.C. App. 333,334-35,204 S.E.2d 239,240 (1974) (holding that local government
was not liable when a tree on private property fell across a public street and damaged the
plaintiff's car because even the residents had not even discovered the hazard).
142. See 19 McQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 54.15, at 94-95 (noting that municipalities are
neither required to ensure ideal traveling conditions nor to protect the public from
"normal hazards").
143. See id. ("If the municipality has knowledge of facts from which it can reasonably
anticipate that harmful consequences may result from its failure to act, it must assume
more responsibility than the passive role of waiting for defects to develop and to be
brought to its attention.").
144. See Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 So. 2d 931, 939 (La. 1991) (holding that
the City remained liable for failing to post "No Diving" signs even though the danger of
diving was or should have been known to the victim, but allowing the recovery to be
HIGH-HAZARD AREAS LIABILITY
Simply giving a warning, however, may not be enough for a local
government to avoid liability in all circumstances. Whether a warning
is sufficient to satisfy a government's duty depends on whom the
government warns. If the government warns people who build in
high-hazard areas of the dangers that inhere in such properties, then
that warning is probably enough to satisfy its duty. This is
particularly true in contributory negligence jurisdictions such as
North Carolina.'45 In contrast, if the government warns those who
have already purchased property in hazard-prone areas based on
previous governmental assurances, or who purchased outside a high-
hazard area and who then sustain damage from property that the
government permitted, that warning should not be sufficient. In
those instances, the government's warning is too late to ameliorate
the risk it created.
Applying these precedents to development in hazardous areas
suggests that local government has a duty not to encourage
development in high-hazard areas. Municipalities implicitly146 assure
prospective builders and buyers that sites are not unduly hazardous 47
when they permit development in or provide public services to those
sites. Government building permits suggest to the permittee that
reduced for carelessness of the victim); 19 MCQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 54.94.50, at 414
(noting the policy of reduction in comparative negligence jurisdictions). In other
jurisdictions, however, the government is under no duty to warn residents if a danger is
apparent. See, e.g., Payne v. Broward County, 461 So. 2d 63, 65 (Fla. 1984) (denying any
municipal liability for a dangerous intersection when the danger was apparent to the
pedestrian victim).
145. Only four states retain the doctrine of contributory negligence. These states
include: Alabama, see Williams v. Delta Int'l. Mach. Corp., 619 So. 2d 1330, 1333 (Ala.
1993); Maryland, see Faith v. Keefer, 736 A.2d 422, 443 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999); North
Carolina, see Hall v. Kmart Corp., - N.C.App. _, 525 S.E.2d 837 (March 7, 2000); and
Virginia, see Lawrence v. Wirth, 309 S.E.2d 315, 317 (Va. 1983). Contributory negligence
prohibits the recovery of damages to any party who itself was negligent, even if the degree
of negligence was slight. See Keith D. Boyette, Note, Reconciling Comparative
Negligence, Contribution and Joint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1159,
1159 n.4 (1977). Accordingly, property owners who are warned of the dangers of building
in high-hazard areas, but who ignore those warnings and engage in development will most
likely be deemed to possess some degree of negligence for any damages that result from
natural hazards. As a result, those property owners would be precluded from recovering
any damages. See, e.g., Hall, 525 S.E.2d at 838 (holding that the doctrine of contributory
negligence would bar a plaintiff's recovery when the plaintiff "actually knew of the unsafe
condition or if a hazard should have been obvious to a reasonable person").
146. The breach of implicit assurances of safety will result in liability if they may be
reasonably relied upon. See Brown v. MacPherson's, Inc., 545 P.2d 13, 18 (Wash. 1975)
(en bane) ("Even where an offer to seek or render aid is implicit and unspoken, a duty to
make good on the promise has been found by most courts if it is reasonably relied upon.").
147. See Kristen Collins, Builder Put Zebulon Houses on Lots in Flood Plain, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Dec. 7,1999, at Al.
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minimum safety standards have been met. Public services, such as
roads, also provide public assurances in that the government
implicitly warrants that the xecipient may rely on their safety. 48
Moreover, the public is entitled to assume that the government
considers the hazard risk to foreseeable public and private projects
when it makes its public service investment decisions. People
purchase and improve their property relying on the assurance of
safety implicit in a government's decision to allow construction or to
build roads, sewer lines, and other infrastructure in an area. 49
Because such purchases and improvements are the direct effects of
the government's action, the government should be held liable when
it makes unreasonable assurances that result in the development of
hazard-prone areas.50
148. See 19 MCQUILLIN, supra note 66, § 54.122, at 533-34 (observing that pedestrians
and motorists are entitled to assume that streets are reasonably safe for travel and that the
government has complied with protective statutes and ordinances). Cf. Belair v. Riverside
County Flood Control Dist. 764 P.2d 1070, 1075 (Cal. 1988) (finding that plaintiffs were
reasonable in relying on the government's levee to protect their homes against floods that
did not exceed its design capacity).
Similarly, the provision of roads, water, and sewer services may create an unsafe
situation by similarly allowing or encouraging development in high-hazard areas. See
GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL HAZARDS MrIGATION, supra note 16, at 39. Indeed,
when Congress decided to restrict development on coastal barrier islands, it elected to do
so through a ban on federal subsidies for infrastructure on those islands. See GODSCHALK
ET AL., COASTAL STORMS, supra note 22, at 8 (estimating that withdrawing federal flood
insurance and infrastructure grants could save $5.4 billion between 1984 and 2004 and
arguing that comparable savings would be available to state and local governments that
adopt a similar approach).
Some public services, such as utilities, pose a different liability concern than
highways in that the user of a public utility would not seek to recover for the danger posed
by the utility itself; rather, the liability would result from the government's implicit
guarantee that an area is safe for development through its decision to locate public utilities
there.
149. The siting of roads and water and sewer services are known to be "growth
shapers." See DAvID J. BROWER ET AL., REDUCING HURRICANE AND COASTAL
HAZARDS THROUGH GROWTH MANAGEMENT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR NORTH CAROLINA
COASTAL LOCALITIES 92-144 (1987). Accordingly, localities should avoid placing roads
and sewers in high-hazard areas, where they will predictably encourage development. See
id. at 145. Where development is highly dependent upon public facilities, local
government decisions will have an especially strong effect on where development occurs.
See id. Flood levees also tend to induce reliance by invariably encouraging a higher rate of
development behind them. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 25; PHILIPPI, supra note 19, at
23-24,76-77.
150. See, e.g., Sextone v. City of Rochester, 301 N.Y.S.2d 887, 888 (N.Y. App. Div.
1969). Courts that deny liability for negligent inspection may do so on the grounds that
safety codes should not make cities the insurers of private property. See Hilliard v. City of
Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. 1991). Nonetheless, some courts' opinions do read as
though they are holding the government to be the insurer of private property. See, e.g.,
Dutton v. Mitek Realty Corp., 463 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) (mem.)
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Governmental actions that promote public safety naturally
inspire the public's expectation of safety in reliance on those
actions,'5' and, in the words of one commentator, "[c]ommon
expectations are the stuff of duty."'5 Liability results from the
government's inability to ensure the level of safety the public
reasonably presumes to result from the government's program. As
the Indian Towing Court noted, mariners should be able to
reasonably assume that a lighthouse will warn of shallow water."'
Similarly, hotel guests reasonably assume that a building that has
undergone a fire inspection does not pose an undue fire hazard.' 4
Likewise, the government's construction of public projects such as
roads "communicates a concern for the individual welfare of
prospective users that entails the further obligation not to tolerate
traps in [such projects], and to rectify conditions that experience
proves dangerous."'15  The existence of such assurances may
encourage individuals to forgo steps they might otherwise take to
ensure their own safety, 6 and the failure of the government to fulfill
the obligations that it has assumed (as measured by a reasonable
degree of reliance) leads to its liability.
Accordingly, when local government approves development
plans and permits in high-hazard areas or approves the provision of
public services to those areas, it assumes a duty to meet the
(holding that the city could be liable to a private party for an injury to fireman resulting
from illegal building design approved by the city). Other courts more accurately describe
the government's duty as an obligation to ensure that its own actions are not undertaken
negligently. See, e.g., Wilson v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664, 673 (Iowa 1979) (holding that a
city may be held liable for negligently performing an inspection it had a statutory duty to
conduct).
151. See SHAPO, supra note 97, at 88-90; see also GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL
HAZARDS MITIGATION, supra note 16, at 39 ("Government efforts to stabilize eroding
shorelines or inlets often encourage further development and provide a false sense that
development is secure .... ).
152. SHAPO, supra note 97, at 88. Indeed, in some instances, the level of common
expectations is raised by background expectations about the standards inherent in
governmental decision-making. Professor Shapo argues that in some instances "the role
of government as a protector of physical security, and citizen dependence on that role, is
such that, if anything, the responsibility of government should be judged more expansively
than that of private parties." Id at 90. Shapo gives as an example the case of highway
design: "The government possesses superior information about hazards as well as the
physical power necessary to produce safer conditions" resulting in "almost total motorist
dependence" on the exercise of government power to assure reasonably safe conditions.
Id. at 87.
153. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-65 (1955).
154. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235,241 (Alaska 1976).
155. SHAPO, supra note 97, at 88-89.
156. See City of Pritchard v. Lasner, 406 So. 2d 990, 992 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981).
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reasonable expectations of the persons who depend on those
activities. The public holds a justifiable perception that government
action to permit or encourage growth in certain areas carries an
implicit acknowledgment that those sites are safe for habitation. As a
result, property owners who are injured because they rely on these
indicia of safety and choose not to take additional steps to protect
their own interests should be entitled to recover from the negligent
government.
Moreover, governments generally should not be able to escape
liability by arguing that natural hazard risks are apparent dangers.
For example, flood risk frequently is not evident to the purchaser of a
property due to the infrequency of such events.157 In other instances,
risk may be obscured by participants in the market, including
developers, real estate agents, or financial lenders who want to
encourage sales. 58 Municipalities are more likely than purchasers,
particularly those who are also new residents, to have notice of
hazard risks to particular properties because the municipalities have
experience with the location and extent of past disasters.'
Government surveys of risk areas also give local jurisdictions notice
of the scope of damage that may be inflicted by "typical" natural
disasters.1 6° As with highway dangers, notice of hazard risk could be
157. Cf. Collins, supra note 152, at Al.
158. See GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION, supra note 16, at 15.
159. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 120 ("The extent to which a community is composed
of relatively new residents... affects the extent of community and household 'memory' of
past disasters.").
160. Unfortunately, government surveys are not uniformly accurate. For example,
flood insurance rate maps provided by the National Flood Insurance Program are
frequently inaccurate as to the scope of floodplains for several reasons, including a lack of
actual floods from which to extrapolate, insufficient analysis, and because they predate
significant changes in land use that affect the flood level. See Katherine Bennett, A Look
at the Effect of Floodplain Management Regulations on Development Patterns in Ten
Northwest Communities, in FROM THE MOUNTAINS TO THE SEA-DEVELOPING LOCAL
CAPABILITIES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
ASSOCIATION OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS 448, 451 (1995); see also J. Andrew
Curliss, State's Flood Maps Outdated, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 31, 1999,
at A10 (noting that recently updated maps in Boone, Charlotte, and Durham, N.C.
predicted flood levels of up to four feet higher than those on previous maps). Bennett
concludes that the federal maps' "liability to imprecision and inaccuracy" results in
marked discrepancies between the mapped floodplains and the natural floodplain.
Bennett, supra, at 449; see also Bob Williams & Matthew Eisley, Why Epic Flooding Took
State by Surprise, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Oct. 10, 1999, at Bi (reporting in
the wake of Hurricane Floyd that floodplain maps in many of North Carolina's worst-hit
communities were outdated). Nonetheless, because these maps represent a widely
accepted standard for where not to build, see PHILIPPI, supra note 19, at 22, they should
provide a starting point for assessing notice for the purposes of establishing municipal
liability.
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imputed to the government by showing that hazard damage had
occurred-either once or repeatedly-and that sufficient time had
elapsed to allow for the discovery of the risk.
Local governments could fulfill their duty to address hazard risks
reasonably by warning potential property owners of the risk in areas
subject to significant or repeated losses. Hazard warnings only will be
effective at reducing hazard losses, however, if they reduce the
number of homeowners who build or live in floodplains. Proponents
of publicly mandated real estate disclosure provisions'6' claim that
notice of hazards reduces the market inefficiencies-such as the lack
of complete information-that promote development in hazard-prone
areas. 62 Nevertheless, in practice, such notice often may prove
ineffective. First, development in hazard areas may depend on
factors other than a lack of notice. For example, people often build in
floodplains because land there is inexpensive 63 and in coastal areas
because private insurance and public subsidies are readily available. 64
The second reason why notice is ineffective is that the methods by
which notice is given may impair its effect on the market. For
example, if a potential homebuyer is given a densely worded notice of
hazards just prior to closing on her purchase, the momentum of the
transaction may dissuade her from giving the warning as much
consideration as she would have given a clearer disclosure made
earlier in the transaction.'6 Although these problems can be reduced
by structuring disclosures effectively, a publicly mandated market
disclosure program may not achieve the goal of reducing hazard
exposure.
Regardless of the legal theory used, any suit against a local
government regarding development in hazardous areas would have to
deal with sovereign immunity. Traditionally, local governments were
immune to most causes of action sounding in tort even if the
governments or their agents acted negligently. 1  Although
161. Disclosure provisions generally require that potential purchasers be informed
some time prior to purchase that the property is subject to certain hazard conditions. See
GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION, supra note 16, at 15. Some
disclosure statutes also require that all purchasers be provided with general educational
materials regarding hazard risk and property ownership. See id
162. See id at iv.
163. See FABER, supra note 8, at 10.
164. See GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL HAZARDS MITIGATION, supra note 16, at 39.
165. See id at 16 (observing that the effectiveness of hazard notification may be
diminished if the notice is given too late, if it is unclear, or if it is not presented seriously).
166. See I CrvIL ACTIONS, supra note 65, § 1.3, at 11.
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governmental immunities have been abrogated in most states,167 many
jurisdictions have partially restored some common-law immunities by
statute.168 The restored immunities commonly protect discretionary
functions 169 and duties deemed owed to the public at large.170
In dealing with liability for development-related problems, courts
have been reluctant to hold local government accountable for a
number of reasons.' First, courts do not wish to make governments
the insurers of private property or development, especially when the
developer or owner may have been partially responsible for the
loss.172 Moreover, potential liability could prevent some governments
from taking appropriate action, even in the case of safety
167. See 1 id., § 1.8, at 21-31. Abrogation has been justified on the grounds that the
municipality, rather than the individual victim, should bear the responsibility of its errors.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C cmt. d. (1965).
168. See 1 CIVILACIIONS, supra note 65, § 1.11, at 36-37.
169. The discretionary function provides that governments will not be liable for "a
good faith exercise of their discretionary powers in a judicial, legislative, or governmental
policy-making function." 2 SHONKWILER & MORGAN, supra note 66, § 26.04, at 261. As
one court noted, "it cannot be tortious conduct for a government to govern." Department
of Transp. v. Neilson, 419 So. 2d 1071, 1075 (Fla. 1982). In jurisdictions recognizing an
exception for discretionary functions, governments are immune for policy-making
functions, but not for negligent implementation of policy. See Bennett v. Tarrant County
Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 894 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex. App. 1995). For
more information about the discretionary function immunity, see 1 CIVIL ACrONS, supra
note 65, §§ 2.4-.7, at 99-120.
170. Under the public duty doctrine, local governments and their agents are not liable
for negligently performing duties owed to the public at large rather than to specific
individuals. See 2 SHONKWILER & MORGAN, supra note 66, § 26.03, at 249. This doctrine
rests on the principle that" 'a duty to all is a duty to no one.'" Hoffer v. State, 755 P.2d
781, 785 (Wash. 1988) (quoting J & B Dev. Co. v. King County, 669 P.2d 468, 471 (Wash.
1983) (en banc)).
171. Some jurisdictions preclude governmental liability for negligent permitting under
the public duty doctrine. See Hilliard v. City of Huntsville, 585 So. 2d 889, 892 (Ala. 1991);
Modlin v. City of Miami Beach, 201 So. 2d 70, 76 (Fla. 1q67); Hannon v. Counihan, 369
N.E.2d 917, 921-22 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 199
N.W.2d 158, 159-60 (Minn. 1972); Georges v. Tudor, 556 P.2d 564, 566-67 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1976). To the extent that public services are provided pursuant to a governmental
policy decision, some jurisdictions will protect those decisions under the discretionary
function immunity. See, e.g., Klingenberg v. City of Raleigh, 212 N.C. 549, 553, 194 S.E.
297, 298 (1937) (holding that a municipality exercises discretion when adopting a plan for
its streets); see also Blackwelder v. City of Concord, 205 N.C. 792, 795, 172 S.E. 392, 393
(1934) (distinguishing between immunity from liability for adopting a plan and liability for
injuries resulting from negligent execution of the plan). See generally 1 CIVIL ACIONS,
supra note 65, § 2.7, at 111-20 (discussing the differences between discretionary and
ministerial decisions). Finally, local governments may be absolved of liability for negligent
permitting by statute. See I CIVIL ACIONS, supra note 65, § 3.15, at 223-32.
172. See Hilliard, 585 So. 2d at 892; District of Columbia v. Forsman, 580 A.2d 1314,
1319 (D.C. 1990); Hoffert, 199 N.W.2d at 159-60; Georges, 556 P.2d at 566.
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regulations. 173
Despite these concerns, however, immunity should not absolve
local governments from liability with regard to development in
hazardous areas. Sovereign immunity is not a defense to nuisance
because local governments are no more privileged to create a
nuisance than are private individuals.74 With regard to negligence, a
policy of not imposing liability minimizes the burden on local
governments in the short-term, but perpetuates larger burdens on
taxpayers in the long-term. Because natural hazards pose such an
acute danger to life and property and cause such widespread costs
and unevenly distributed damage, enhancing the long-term safety and
equity of the community should be the top policy priority.
In contrast, the policy objections to liability have been
overstated. For example, the fear that imposing liability on local
governments will convert them into insurers misstates the role of
government liability. Courts that reject immunity generally do not
treat the government as an insurer and instead, often reduce recovery
to the degree that a plaintiff undertook or contributed to an obviously
dangerous activity. 75 Courts that reject or amend immunity to permit
a cause of action simply conclude that governments should take
responsibility for their own errors. 76 As one court has noted,
government is unlikely to take responsibility for its actions because of
the financial costs and inconvenience of correcting past mistakes in
173. See Hilliard, 585 So. 2d at 892.
174. See Banks v. Brunswick, 529 F. Supp. 695, 698 (S.D. Ga. 1981); Lukas v. New
Haven, 439 A.2d 949, 952 (Conn. 1981); Board of Educ. v. Mayor of Riverdale, 578 A.2d
207,209 (Md. 1990); Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389,394-95 (Minn. 1984).
175. See Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 So. 2d 931, 939-40, 942-43 (La. 1991)
(holding that city remained liable for failing to post "No Diving" signs even though the
danger of diving was or should have been known to the victim, but allowing recovery to be
reduced for the carelessness of the victim). The acts of a landowner in developing
property she knew to be subject to hazards could lead courts to find contributory
negligence, especially when the landowner altered the property in a manner that increased
the hazard risk, such as removing protective dunes on the coast, vegetation from hillsides,
or wetlands from flood-hazard areas. A person is contributorily negligent when that
person's conduct "falls below the standard to which he should conform for his own
protection." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965). Courts also relieve
governments of liability for damage solely attributable to extraordinary events. See
Glisson v. City of Mobile, 505 So. 2d 315, 319 n.2 (Ala. 1987) (noting that a city is not
liable for negligence when flooding would have caused the same damage anyway).
176. See Steinke v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation, 520
S.E.2d 142, 153 (S.C. 1999) (holding a state agency liable for its failure to inspect an
amusement ride after the agency became aware that the owner had made a dangerous
modification to the ride). The Steinke court noted that the purpose of inspections would
be defeated if the government were not liable for its gross negligence in performing
inspections. See iL
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the absence of court-imposed liability.'7 Because of this lack of
motivation, a government that is protected by immunity may be more
willing to tolerate ineffective programs than one that is vulnerable to
liability.
Another reason cited for immunizing local governments from
hazard-related liability is that liability could discourage hazard
mitigating activities. 7 8 Most local governments are not liable for
nonfeasance, 179 even when government action would reduce the risk
of a public harmY.80  Thus, some courts have argued that if local
governments were liable for poorly implemented policies, some might
choose not to incur that risk at all.'' Indeed, one court has suggested
that imposing local government liability for hazards in projects that it
had inspected "would serve only to destroy the municipality's
motivation or financial ability to support this important service. ''lm
To counter such logic, courts that permit liability have noted that
most local governments traditionally have been held liable for
fundamental duties, such as the duty to provide safe roadways, and
that such liability has not curtailed these activities.183 Furthermore,
courts have recognized that increases in liability have not put an
unbearable strain on governments.'8 Indeed, disaster mitigation is
often cost-effective: the cost of mitigation, including liability, is far
outweighed by the hazard-induced losses that are prevented. In
Alaska, for instance, fire inspections and liability for negligent
177. See id. at 673-74 ("Municipalities are not going to be motivated toward
meaningful inspections while insulated from their employees' negligence with respect to
these statutory duties [to inspect].").
178. See, e.g., Hilliard, 585 So. 2d at 892.
179. See City of Pritchard v. Lasner, 406 So. 2d 990, 992 (Ala. Civ. App. 1981)
(indicating that a city cannot be held liable for failing to exercise its authority to construct
drainage); Coffey v. City of Berkeley, 149 P. 559, 560 (Cal. 1915) (holding that a city was
under no duty to build a bridge across a dangerous stream bank); Hayashi v. Alameda
County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist., 334 P.2d 1048, 1051-52 (Cal. Ct. App.
1959) (noting that "it is probably the law that a flood district is under no enforceable
obligation to build levees or other public improvements to keep out floods").
180. See Coffey, 149 P. at 560 (holding that the failure to erect a bridge where a road
neared a steep stream bank was a proper exercise of city's discretion, for which no liability
would attach).
181. See Hilliard, 585 So. 2d at 892.
182 Id.
183. See Adams v. State, 555 P.2d 235, 244 (Alaska 1976) (noting that liability for road
hazards has not stopped construction of highways and that limited liability for negligence
in an inspection is unlikely to stop the state from continuing to conduct fire inspections);
Board of Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enter. Co., 273 So. 2d 19, 25-26 (La. 1973)
(discussing the ubiquity of government intervention and the need for governmental
responsibility).
184. See Splendour Shipping, 273 So. 2d at 25.
[Vol. 781564
HIGH-HAZARD AREAS LIABILITY
inspections has proven far less costly than the fires would have
been.1'
Beyond the specific issues in the immunity debate, holding local
governments accountable for hazardous development also is
supported by broader policy and structural arguments. Unless
municipalities are held liable by the courts, they may not have the
ability or the political will to pursue the safest development
restrictions.'86 Many local governments are under significant political
and economic pressure to accept or even encourage new
development.1' 7 Municipalities also may be concerned about liability
if an attempt to remedy a hazard situation fails' 18 and about the risk
that their regulatory measures will be deemed a taking of private
property.89
The takings issue is particularly urgent in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lucas, which held that a South
Carolina beach setback provision effected a complete taking that
required the State to compensate the property owner $1.2 million. 90
Commentators report that Lucas has had a chilling effect on local
governments, which are afraid that strict rules and development
limitations could make them liable for potentially millions of dollars
in damages.'9'
A close reading of Lucas, however, suggests that local
governments still have broad authority to mitigate damage from
natural hazards and nuisances. Takings law traditionally
distinguished between takings that created a public benefit, which
were compensable, and those that prevented a public harm, which
185. See Adams, 555 P.2d at 244 (arguing that the cost of inspections, including liability
for negligent inspections, "is still less than the cost to the state of disastrous fires, in terms
of fire-fighting effort, lost taxes, and the impact on the economy").
186. See MILETI, supra note 13, at 144, 160. This reluctance often stems from an
unwillingness to spend money combating low-frequency (albeit high-risk) events or from a
political antipathy toward private property regulations. See id at 160.
187. See GODSCHALK ET AL., COASTAL STORMS, supra note 22, at 43 (noting "the
opposition of development interests to government intervention into the land
development market").
188. See MILET, supra note 13, at 151. Local government liability, however, is unlikely
to arise when a local government enacts regulations that successfully reduce hazard risk.
See infra notes 219-33 (discussing how courts generally uphold regulatory efforts enacted
to reduce hazard risks based on a government's reasonable exercise of its police powers).
189. See MELTZ ET AL.,supra note 59, at 263-64 (discussing growth management).
190. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1029-30 (1992).
191. See PLATT, supra note 16, at 295 ("I[T]he threat of Lucas-based lawsuits has
caused public agencies at all levels of government to refrain from restricting property
rights, even in the face of well-documented natural hazards.").
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were not.' 2 Recognizing that an analysis regarding whether a statute
is effecting a benefit or preventing a harm is likely to devolve into an
argument over semantics,193 the Supreme Court in Lucas rejected the
benefit-harm distinction in favor of distinctions drawn by the
common law of nuisance for evaluating complete takings. Lucas
presented the question of whether a South Carolina state beach
management statute that proscribed development within a certain
distance of the water effected a taking.194 The Court held that when a
regulation deprives a landowner of all economically viable use of his
property, that deprivation will amount to a taking unless it is designed
to prevent nuisance uses that had been traditionally prevented by
192. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 313 (1987) (holding that a temporary ban on reconstruction in a floodplain could
amount to a taking if it were not a proper governmental purpose to enact such safety
regulations as would deny all use of the property); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 596 (1962) (upholding the Town prohibition of mining as a valid exercise of
police power); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) (declaring that "[a]
prohibition [based] simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot,
in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public
benefit"); Usdin v. State, Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Div. of Water Resources, 414 A.2d
280, 290 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (upholding floodplain development restriction
against a takings claim because the restriction had harm-prevention goals as its primary
purposes); Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768, 769 (Wis. 1972) (holding that
land use regulations restricting the use of property to "natural and indigenous uses" does
not effect a taking where it prevents harm to public waterways); see also PETER W.
SALSICH & TIMOTHY J. TRYNIECKI, LAND USE REGULATION 84 (1998) ("Generally, if
the regulation prevents a harm, the use of the police power generally has been upheld
despite the impact on land use; if the regulation extracts a public benefit, however, such as
a scenic easement, courts have held that a taking is effected.").
Justice Stevens dissented from the Court's decision in First English, arguing that it
was not necessary for the Court to remand the case because it was reasonable to find that
the church, like its similarly situated neighbors, was prevented only from creating a
dangerous situation akin to a nuisance and, therefore, did not suffer a taking. See First
English, 482 U.S. at 325 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens contended that when a
government regulation seeks to impose health and safety limitations on property use of
the type at issue in First English, "it may not be 'burdened with the condition that [it] must
compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of
their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community.'" Id. at 326 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
669 (1887)). Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that the "government ... surely may
restrict access to hazardous areas" under a power akin to that by which it may prevent
nuisances. ld. at 325-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
193. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025-26 n.12 ("In Justice Blackmun's view.., the test for
required compensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-preventing
justification for its action. Since such a justification can be formulated in practically every
case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid staff.").
194. See id& at 1008. The distance was calculated based on historical rates of erosion.
See i&. at 1009.
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state property law.195 The majority reasoned that regulations that
address health, safety, and welfare do not invoke takings, even when
they prevent any economic use of a property, because a landowner's
title never included a property interest in the endangering use.196
Justice Scalia illustrated the Court's holding with the example of the
nuclear power plant that is discovered, after construction, to have
been built on an earthquake fault.' 97 Justice Scalia reasoned that
because no government would knowingly allow power plants to exist
on such a dangerous site, there would be no taking in requiring the
one particular plant to remove its structures. Therefore, Lucas
demonstrates that the government can prevent a landowner from
using her property in a manner that harms or risks serious harm to
her neighbor.
The rationale for the Court's finding that a taking occurred in
Lucas stemmed from the specific facts of the case. The plaintiff,
David Lucas, had bought, and was entitled to develop, two
oceanfront lots prior to the law's enactment. 9 The enactment of
South Carolina's beach management statute, however, had the effect
of declaring Lucas's lots completely unbuildable.0 ° Justice Scalia,
speaking for the Court, expressed skepticism that South Carolina's
law was intended to reduce hazard risk, noting that owners of existing
structures were allowed to remain in the hazard area and rebuild after
a disaster if their houses were not totally destroyed.20' The Court
suggested that because Lucas's neighbors-who lived on equally
dangerous properties-were allowed to remain and rebuild, the
hazard purposes of the statute were not its primary goal.2 Finally,
Justice Scalia explained that many of the South Carolina legislature's
"harm-preventing" justifications for the beacbfront setback "seem to
195. See id at 1027-29. Justice Scalia noted that the state's power therefore is limited
to the extent that it is entitled "to abate nuisances that affect the public generally" or to
destroy property in order to prevent "grave threats to the lives and property of others."
Id at 1029 & n.16.
196. See id at 1027.
197. See id at 1029-30.
198. See id. Justice Scalia's other example of a nuisance suggests that inherent
property rights do not include the right to flood a neighbor's property: "[T]he owner of a
lake-bed ... would not be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit
to engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding others' land."
Id at 1029.
199. See id at 1008.
200. See id. at 1008-09.
201. See id at 1024-25 n.11.
202. See id.
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us phrased in 'benefit-conferring' language."2 °3 As a result, the Court
remanded the case to the South Carolina Supreme Court.2°
Since Lucas, other courts have held that hazardous land uses
constitute a nuisance for which Lucas-style takings claims will not be
available.20 5 In M & J Coal Co. v. United States,2 6 for instance, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied a takings claim in
which the Department of the Interior ordered the defendant's mining
operations to halt after the company caused significant subsidence of
the surface above the mine.Y° M & J argued that it had purchased
and held title to the right to subside the surface.208 The court
concluded that although M & J's title granted it the right to subside
the property above the mine, the right to create a hazard to public
203. Id. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun identified the prevention of hazards as the
primary purpose behind the regulation and would have upheld the regulation on that
reasoning. See id. at 1039-40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Cf. Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town
of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Mass. 1972) (upholding local floodplain regulations and
noting that a provision advocating wildlife conservation was seeking an incidental benefit
and did not conflict with the enabling legislation's primary goal of reducing hazard risk);
see also PLATr, supra note 16, at 151 (observing that the Court "said nothing whatsoever
about coastal hazards in the Lucas case itself").
204. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032. On remand the South Carolina Supreme Court
rejected the State's argument that a common law nuisance basis existed to prohibit
construction on Lucas' property, therefore, holding that the statute effected a taking. See
Lucas, 424 S.E.2d 484,486 (S.C. 1992).
Justice Stevens repeated his harm-prevention argument in his dissent to Lucas,
arguing that the development of hazard-prone property was a proper use of the state's
police powers. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens did
not contend, and Lucas did not decide, however, whether construction in hazard areas
constitutes a "noxious use." Although the Court appeared to believe that development of
the lots at issue in Lucas was not a nuisance because it would not have increased the harm
to neighbors, see id. at 1024-25 & n.11, coastal geologists have noted that even though
shorefront development may not affect its lateral neighbors, it can increase the risk of
flooding to inland properties, see BUSH ET AL., supra note 25, at 24, 50, 55-56, 60 (arguing
that development on coastal barrier islands poses a risk to adjacent properties). Ironically,
in the wake of Lucas, commentators expected that the decision would result in a broader
view of what constitutes a nuisance. See Robert H. Freilich & Elizabeth A. Garvin,
Takings After Lucas: Growth Management, Planning, and Regulatory Implementation Will
Work Better Than Before, in AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING
OF PROPERTY WrrHouT COMPENSATION 53,68 (David L. Callies ed., 1993).
205. See M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1155 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also
Wilson v. Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43, 44-46 (Mass. 1992) (holding that the state's
failure to permit beachfront property owners to erect a seawall before erosion destroyed
their homes did not constitute a taking and, in dicta, distinguishing the case from Lucas on
the grounds that the state may prohibit uses that pose a risk to others or to the state).
206. 47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
207. See id. at 1155. The subsidence caused significant harm to nearby private
property, public utility connections, and the town's water storage tank. See id. at 1151-52.
208. See id. at 1152-53.
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safety is never part of a landowner's property rights.0 9 The court
remarked that "[j]ustice and fairness do not require that the
community at large bear the 'burden' of M & J's inability to mine in a
manner that is safe to the public."2 "0
Despite the fear of takings claims, the premise that local
government may reduce hazard risk through the regulation of private
property is generally sound. The Supreme Court has held that
regulation of development in hazardous areas to limit damage from
natural hazard events is a proper use of local governments' police
powers n The police powers authorize local governments to protect
and promote the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens?'2 Courts
have held that police powers authorize governments to act, not only
through zoning 13 and the enforcement of building codes,1 4 but also
through regulations that preserve open space1 5 and limit hazard-
prone development in floodplains.2 16 The public power to regulate
209. See id. at 1154.
210. Id at 1155.
211. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1994) (holding that regulation
of floodplains to prevent flooding is a legitimate public purpose). In Lucas, the plaintiff
challenged a statewide beachfront setback regulation that was designed in part to "protect
life and property." Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1021 n.10. While upholding the challenge on other
grounds, the Court noted that the plaintiff had not challenged the state's police power to
enact the legislation. See id. at 1009; see also PLAIr, supra note 16, at 157 (noting that
Lucas "need not be cause for alarm to hazard mitigators if it is read carefully"). Having a
proper governmental purpose is important because a taking will result if the regulation
does not serve a proper purpose, even when the regulation does not completely eliminate
the value of the property. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470,485 (1987).
212. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926); Corn v. City of
Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 1993); Mestre v. City of Atlanta, 255
F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1958).
213. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397 (upholding the separation of incompatible uses
through zoning); Shea v. Board of Appeals, 622 N.E.2d 1382, 1385 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993)
(holding that a town may refuse to grant permits to build houses on lots lacking sufficient
access for emergency vehicles).
214. See Hidden Oaks, Ltd. v. Austin, 138 F.3d 1036, 1043-44 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that a municipality's blocking of utility service to substandard housing to keep it
unoccupied and to ensure that it is brought up to code is a proper use of police powers).
The district court in Hidden Oaks relied upon Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523
(1967), which held that "'the police power of municipalities to impose and enforce ...
minimum standards [extended to] existing structures' and ... that 'the public interest
demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated.'" Hidden Oaks, 138 F.3d
at 1043 (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 535, 537).
215. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,261 (1980).
216. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386-87; Responsible Citizens in Opposition to the
Floodplain Ordinance v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 265, 302 S.E.2d 204, 211 (1983);
see also MELTZ ET AL., supra note 59, at 227 ("Protecting the health and safety of the
public is the foremost justification for all police power regulations, and floodplain
regulations have long been recognized in this category."); 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR.,
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land use for health and safety purposes is not unlimited,217 but will
result in a "categorical" taking only if it compels a physical invasion
of private property28 or if it "denies all economically beneficial or
productive use of land. 21
Fortunately, hazard mitigation is unlikely to trigger a successful
takings challenge. First, Lucas-style categorical takings apply only
when the government prohibits all economically beneficial use of
landY20  Such complete deprivations are rarer although some
uncertainty remains in this area because the Court has not explained
in detail how to determine when no economic use remains.m In the
RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 7.04[2], at 7-21 (4th ed. 1998)
(noting that no court has held the government's control of flood-prone areas to be ultra
vires). The police power authority is frequently cited in state legislation enabling local
control over development in floodplains. See 1 ZIEGLER, supra, § 7.04[2], at 7-22.
Nevertheless, courts have been willing to infer such authority, however, even when it is
not explicitly granted. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Town of Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 894
(Mass. 1972).
217. See Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 153 A.2d 822, 824 (Conn. 1959)
(upholding a ban on construction in a floodplain, but observing that "[t]he police power
has limitations in the extent to which it can properly destroy or diminish the value of
property" and that "[w]here those limitations would be exceeded, the power of eminent
domain must be used").
218. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992) (citing
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that
regulatory action that compels a physical invasion of private property results in a taking of
that property)). Physical invasions of private property are takings regardless of the nature
of their public purpose. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
219. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16. Less than complete reductions in the value of land do
not trigger a "categorical" taking. See id. at 1015-16 & n.6; see also A-S-P Ass'n v. City of
Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207, 218, 258 S.E.2d 444, 451 (1979) (upholding a historic district
ordinance and noting that "the mere fact that an ordinance results in the depreciation of
the value of an individual's property or restricts to a certain degree the right to develop it
as he deems appropriate is not sufficient reason to render the ordinance invalid").
220. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29. A taking may result from less than complete
losses when the regulation does not "'substantially advance legitimate state interests.'"
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,485 (1987) (quoting Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). The Court has repeatedly held, however,
that hazard mitigation is a legitimate state interest. See supra note 214 and accompanying
text.
221. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018; see also Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park
Corp. v. Town of Fort Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 1998) ("Not all regulatory
deprivations amount to regulatory takings, and a regulatory deprivation that causes land
to have 'less value' does not necessarily make it 'valueless.' "); MELTZ ET AL., supra note
59, at 141 ("Total takings arise in relatively few cases.").
222. In Lucas, the Court acknowledged the difficulty of this problem, especially when
the Court itself has not made clear the basis for measuring total loss. Lucas, 505 U.S. at
1016-17 n.7 (noting that "uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in our
'deprivation' fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court"). In his
dissent to Lucas, Justice Stevens argued that the land was not "valueless," noting that the
plaintiff could have used the beachfront property for recreation or could have sold it to his
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case of floodplain restrictions, government regulations that limit the
use of private property to agriculture, passive recreation, or even
parking have been held to preserve sufficient economic uses.
Moreover, local governments have even more authority to abate
nuisances than they do to regulate generally. With regard to
nuisances, Lucas suggests that governments can take abatement
actions that completely deprive landowners of all economically viable
use of their land without effecting a taking 4  Thus, in such
situations, the government is not "taking" a private benefit from the
land owner, but rather, is acting to prevent the landowner from
obtaining private benefits from actions that harm neighboring
landowners or the public at large. 5
Lucas may have frightened governments from actions that
reduce hazard risk and yet fall well short of complete takings.2 6 With
or without Lucas, there will be instances in which communities may
have to purchase land to avoid development0 7 Nonetheless, in most
instances, a taking may be avoided-and the public good may be
equally served-by limiting the use of hazard-prone property. For
example, communities can slow or redirect development through
their capital facilities policies without taking property s  Zoning
neighbors as a buffer. Id. at 1065 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At least one lower court has
held that there is no inherent right to alter property to achieve an economic return when it
will cause harm to neighboring property. See Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761,
768 (Wis. 1972) ("An owner of land has no absolute and unlimited right to change the
essential natural character of his land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited
in its natural state and which injures the rights of others.").
223. See Turnpike Realty Co. v. Dedham, 284 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Mass. 1972); Krah v.
Nine Mile Creek Watershed Dist., 283 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Minn. 1979); MELTZ ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 228.
224. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
225. See Vartelas v. Water Resources Comm'n, 153 A.2d 822, 824 (Conn. 1959) ("The
police power regulates use of property because uncontrolled use would be harmful to the
public interest. Eminent domain, on the other hand, takes private property because it is
useful to the public." (citing Town of Windsor v. Whitney, 111 A. 354, 356 (Conn. 1920))).
Nuisance law promotes the principle that a person cannot use her own land in a manner
that injures another's land or the public in general. See MELTZ ET AL., supra note 59, at
213.
226. For a discussion of land use management tools available to local governments, see
generally BROWER ET AL., supra note 154, at 92-145; MILETI, supra note 13, at 156-58.
227. See BROWER ET AL., supra note 154, at 121 (noting that purchase is typically the
most effective means of "reducing the extent of exposure to storm hazards"). Purchases in
fee simple offer the most control, but the costs of acquisition will be a significant burden
on most local governments' budgets. See id. at 123. In some cases, the purchase cost may
be defrayed by purchasing an easement or leasing or selling the property back to a private
owner with a prohibition on development attached to the deed. See id. at 125.
228. The Fourth Circuit recently confirmed that a municipality's refusal to extend
services from public facilities does not constitute a taking. See Front Royal & Warren
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ordinances can reduce the risk of losses by controlling the amount
and type of property exposed to natural hazards. 29 In the case of
floodplains, zoning measures have withstood takings challenges so
long as they preserve some degree of economic use, such as
agriculture, forestry, or commercial recreation.2z0
Unfortunately, however, local governments are unlikely to
pursue such measures aggressively unless courts begin to hold them
accountable for their actions. Lucas has given local governments one
more reason to avoid developing and ardently implementing effective
mitigation policies.231 The risk of takings suits, when combined with
traditional governmental immunity and federal disaster aid, insulates
local governments from their own land use errors and omissions. The
combination has shifted safety risks to private citizens and property
risks to the national government. A countervailing liability is
necessary to reconcentrate accountability for both public safety and
private property at the level of government that is most directly
responsible for permitting development in hazardous areas. Local
government liability would help break the cycle of development and
destruction by reducing the structural bias toward development in
hazardous areas, by encouraging the dedication of local resources to
hazard avoidance, and by reducing the long-term risk to life and
property. Although states cannot fully prepare for a storm with the
magnitude of Hurricane Floyd, the careful siting of homes and
businesses that would be encouraged by local government liability for
permitting development in hazard areas would reduce future losses
and speed recoveries.
CHRISTOPHER CITY
County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, Va., 135 F.3d 275, 285-86 (4th Cir.
1998) (upholding the Town's refusal to provide water and sewer service to a private
industrial park and noting that there is "absolutely no warrant for the proposition that
where the government does not affirmatively prohibit the realization of investment-
backed expectations, but merely refuses to enhance the value of real property, a
compensable taking has occurred").
229. See BROWER ET AL., supra note 154, at 92.
230. See id at 94.
231. See PLATr, supra note 16, at 294-95. According to one commentator, "the threat
of Lucas-based lawsuits has caused public agencies at all levels of government to refrain
from restricting property rights, even in the face of well-documented natural hazards." Id.
(noting also that the lower federal courts have not actively overturned regulations in the
wake of Lucas).
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